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distinctive of divine agency. If convincing, they show that we could have
reason to ally ourselves with, even subordinate our wills to, other human
persons who do not subscribe to familiar welfare-oriented goodness.
Moreover, his culminating case that his view outdoes competitors in
accounting for the central Christian orthodoxy that God loves us, though
God doesn’t have to would be more persuasive if tied to familiar models
of human love. I think that this route is open to him. In my view, just as
human ethics is probably more like the divine ethics that Murphy defends,
so ideals of human love share more with his conception of divine love.
Alongside analogs to political authority, Murphy might have considered
comparisons with models of parental love.
To put my central point in a friendlier way, Murphy has more resources
than he uses to display the possibility of a compelling God—worthy of
worship, allegiance and even love—who nevertheless departs from familiar welfare-oriented goodness. Murphy’s God can seem an unpleasant
character, who demands obedience in a way that looks arbitrary, or uses a
superior position to extract allegiance through a kind of bribery. Murphy
works to tamp down this impression, rightly emphasizing appealing aspects of God’s character that the view accommodates and makes salient.
But there is more that he can say along these lines, and the closer that we
can come to understanding God as sharing, rather than departing from,
motivations we recognize as good in human beings, the less trouble this
sort worry will cause.
I have focused on just one of many possible lines of response to
Murphy’s rich and intricate argument. Like any good philosophical work,
God’s Own Ethics raises many questions even as it provides important insights. The book is a true achievement worthy of careful study and much
discussion.

Exemplarist Moral Theory, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 288. $57.35 (hardcover).
RICHARD KIM, Loyola University Chicago
In every area of philosophy, novel theories are rare. In normative ethics,
for instance, the theoretical terrain seems well mapped out by deontology,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. While fine-tuning and adjustments of
each theory continue, it is not easy to find a theory of morality that doesn’t
fall within these three categories. For this reason alone Linda Zagzebski’s
proposal of a new moral theory, “exemplarist moral theory” (EMT), is an
extraordinary achievement. (Note: in earlier works she takes exemplarism
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as a form of virtue ethics, but in this book she presents exemplarism as
its own sui generis theory.) Of course, if a new moral theory is incoherent, lacks explanatory force, or produces deeply problematic moral views,
there is little reason to celebrate it. Fortunately, in this case, while there
are some challenges to raise, Zagzebski’s theory is coherent, elegant, systematizes and explains much of our moral thought and practice (though
certainly not all, as she would acknowledge), and offers important practical insights. Especially refreshing is Zagzebski’s attention to the way that
theory and practice ought to be, when possible, connected to each other
in mutually supporting ways. Early in the book, Zagzebski notes how at
least some students who read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics fail to gain any
comprehension because they are unable to find a link between Aristotle’s
reflections and their lived moral experience. Zagzebski points out, rightly
in my view, that ethical theories should be able to connect with our lived
experiences as moral agents and guide our lives in some useful way. Her
book satisfies this desideratum with characteristic breadth, clarity, and elegance that those who know her work admire her for.
Below I’ll identify what I see as four key concepts in Zagzebski’s theory
that structure the book. I will then discuss two possible objections to her
theory. It is worth noting that Zagzebski’s book is both interdisciplinary
and wide-ranging, covering metaethics, normative theory, moral psychology, and the philosophy of language. The following discussion, therefore,
will omit much of her more technical discussions in order to focus on the
central themes of her book.
Moral Theory. What is a moral theory for Zagzebski? She gives the following concise statement, “I think of a moral theory as an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematize, and justify our moral beliefs and
practices” (5). A helpful analogy Zagzebski draws on is that of a map.
Moral theories are like maps in the following ways: (a) they simplify and
ignore certain parts of the terrain, (b) they provide a picture of the layout,
and (c) they do not necessarily conflict with each other since, like maps,
they may be mapping out different areas of the field.
Moral Exemplars. EMT is, Zagzebski argues, foundationalist in the sense
that the entire theory is grounded in moral exemplars. Moral exemplars
are, “those persons whom we see, on close observation and with reflection,
to be admirable in all or most of their acquired traits” (65). The three kinds
of moral exemplars are heroes, saints, and sages. Heroes like Leopold
Socha risk great harm to themselves to help those in distress. Saints like
Jean Vanier exemplify excellent spiritual and moral traits. Sages like Confucius possess wisdom and exemplify both intellectual and moral virtue.
Zagzebski argues that we identify these exemplars through the emotion
of admiration and can observe them through narratives about them (for
example, in books or films), personal experience, or controlled empirical
studies.
Direct Reference Theory. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam and
Saul Kripke, Zagzebski argues that to pick out or identify good persons it
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is not necessary for ordinary people to know the nature of good persons
(what makes them good). Just as before anybody knew the nature of water
as H2O they were able to identify instances of water, we don’t need a descriptive meaning of “good persons” before we can properly identify who
the good people are. Good people are people like that. All we need to know
are the “superficial features” of good people to pick them out. We can then
proceed to investigate the deeper structure of good people through close
observation of their lives.
The Emotion of Admiration. At the heart of Zagzebski’s views on the identification of moral exemplars is the emotion of admiration. Admiration is
a distinct emotion that helps us track what is admirable. As an emotion it
has an object and can more or less fit with its object (the admirable). Admiration, as an emotion, also has a characteristic feel and has motivational
power. Since moral exemplars are the foundation of her theory and reflective admiration is the key emotion that allows us to pick out the moral
exemplars, admiration is a central part of her theory.
Let me now turn to my first objection, which is that the reliable identification of moral exemplars is far too tenuous to allow moral exemplars
to serve as the ultimate foundation of a moral theory. At times Zagzebski
seems overly confident about the level of agreement concerning who the
moral exemplars are:
I think that we are more certain that Confucius, Jesus, and Socrates are admirable than we are of claims about the good of pleasure, or what human
flourishing is, or the good of doing one’s duty, or any of the other claims that
are used to ground a moral theory. In fact, I think that we are more certain
that they are admirable than we are of what is admirable about them. (10)

While I myself agree with Zagzebski that these three figures count as
moral exemplars, it is not at all clear to me how widespread this view is
or how confident people would be about this claim. Would Aristotle have
considered Jesus a moral exemplar? And on Confucius’s view, the historical Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), by leaving his wife and children,
exemplified a grave moral defect. Perhaps even more problematically,
people have admired figures like Achilles, Genghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin,
and Kim Jong Il. Here Zagzebski might reply that at least for figures like
Hitler, Stalin, or Kim, it is unclear how much of the admiration was based
on false information; it could very well be that the people that have admired them usually didn’t have an accurate understanding of what they
were really like. But this idea doesn’t seem applicable when it comes to
figures like Achilles or Genghis Khan and other violent figures in warrior
cultures. It is also worth noting that the last statement of the preceding
passage doesn’t seem quite right since one’s view that someone is admirable appears closely connected to what one finds admirable about her; I
will return to this point below.
Zagzebski does acknowledge the possibility of error in identifying exemplars:
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This theory is compatible with the view that our identification of exemplars
is revisable. Just as we can be mistaken in our judgment that some sample
of what we call “water” is really water, we can also be mistaken in our judgment that some person we call paradigmatically “good” is really good.
However, I do not think that we could be mistaken about most exemplars
for the same reason that we cannot be mistaken that most of what we take
to be water is water. That is because there is connection in meaning between
good persons and the individuals we identify as good: Good persons are
persons like that, just as water is stuff like that.” (16)

The analogy with water, however, seems to break down in a dramatic
way since there is little disagreement with regard to the identification of
water, but there are much deeper disagreements not only across culture
and time but even within a given culture with regard to who the truly
admirable people are.
The second objection is that the virtues, rather than moral exemplars,
seem more fundamental, given some of her core ideas. On Zagzebski’s
view, just as the deep nature of water is its molecular structure, the deep
nature of moral exemplars is their psychological structure. But what does
Zagzebski mean by the deep psychological structure of an agent? Presumably it has to do with their moral character, motivations, and dispositions—in short, the virtues. In fact Zagzebski does identify the virtues as
what make people admirable, and therefore, moral exemplars (104–105).
But in that case aren’t the virtues more fundamental than the moral exemplars since the virtues are what make someone an exemplar?
I think Zagzebski might reply by drawing attention to the way that
water—a fundamental item in in our ontology—also has a deep structure
(being H2O). But, Zagzebski might note, H2O isn’t more fundamental than
water; it’s just what water essentially is. So perhaps the thought is that
being virtuous is what moral exemplars essentially are, and while the
virtues explain the behaviors and attitudes of moral exemplars, they aren’t
more fundamental, though they are essentially connected to moral exemplars. But there are two points that seem to make this analogy between
water and moral exemplars problematic. The first is that what we call the
virtues—which is the analog of the molecular structure of water—vary
widely across culture and time, a point made above. For example, filial
piety and ritual propriety are fundamental virtues in China (especially
after Confucianism had made its mark) which we don’t find extolled in
modern America. Or, we don’t find the virtue of humility widely discussed
in ancient Greece, which played a crucial role in medieval Christendom.
A corresponding point is that the list of exemplars, as suggested earlier,
are also radically different across cultures. Zagzebski does aknowledge
something like this possibility and how it might derail her theory: “If it
turned out that exemplars have nothing at all in common psychologically,
we would probably conclude that admirability is a superficial feature like
being colorless and tasteless is for water” (104). But she doesn’t seem to
see that there are strong reasons for thinking this possibility is actual.
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On a related topic, something seems to be off in the way that the superficial properties that help us fix the reference of exemplars are connected
to the deep properties of exemplars. Zagzebski identifies the performance
of observable acts of heroism or saintliness (and presumably sageliness)
as the superficial properties that fix the reference of exemplars and the
motivational structures of exemplars (i.e., their virtues) as the deep properties. But this doesn’t seem right because our identification of exemplars
includes things like good motives and intentions. We don’t just see a bare
act of jumping in the water to save the child’s life as what makes someone’s action heroric, but jumping in the water to save the child’s life with
the motive of saving the child’s life for her sake as the heroic act. Of course, we
don’t have immediate access to the intention or motive of the agent and so
often just assume that such an intention or motive is there. But that doesn’t
mean that we don’t think the heroic act isn’t partially constituted by those
motives or intentions. This is demonstrated by the fact that once we find
out that someone jumped in to save the drowning child only because there
would be a rich reward, we no longer characterize that behavior as heroic.
What this suggests is that even fixing the referent of moral exemplars requires some grasp of what good motives and intentions are. So unlike the
way we can identify and fix the reference of water without understanding its deeper structure, we cannot understand moral exemplars without
having at least some grasp of the deeper structure of moral exemplars (i.e.,
the virtues). This poses a problem for Zagzebski’s view because it turns
out that even the identification of moral exemplars requires some grasp of
the virtues, which inevitably leads to deep disagreements about who the
moral exemplars are. But one of Zagzebski’s central motivations for taking
moral exemplars as a foundational starting point was precisely that claims
about moral exemplars are less problematic and contentious than claims
about human flourishing, duties, or virtues (10).
Exemplarist Moral Theory is a wonderful contribution to moral philosophy that rewards careful study. Our moral lives are deeply shaped by
admirable figures, both fictional and real. These figures, whether heroes,
saints, or sages, leave a formidable and enduring mark on us, inspring and
guiding us in a world fraught with moral challenges. Zagzebski’s book not
only captures this significant feature of human lives but also enriches the
theoretical landscape by deepening our understanding of an important
concept that ought to play a greater role in ethical theorizing. (I would like
to thank Tom Carson for very helpful discussions and comments regarding this review.)

